The Returning Nightmare: Europe’s Far Right and the Fading of Democratic Memory

In April 1945, on a surviving piece of wall amid the ruins of Berlin, someone had written a chilling message: “We will return.” For decades, neither Nazism nor fascism managed to take root again in Europe. Yet today, the rapid rise of far-right parties across the continent suggests that the shadows of that dark era are once again reappearing.

A past believed to be buried

For many years, far-right parties were either banned or severely punished by society, resulting in extremely low vote shares. In some cases, states dissolved them outright: Greece’s neo-Nazi Golden Dawn was shut down by judicial order, and the Workers’ Party in the Czech Republic was dissolved by the courts — reflecting Europe’s long-standing resistance to extremist movements in the post-war era. But in recent years, racism once thought to be buried has resurfaced — and in some European countries, has even translated into electoral and governmental power.

However, the postwar rejection of fascism was neither uniform nor absolute. In several European countries, pro-Nazi sympathies did not disappear with military defeat. Former Nazi officials continued to hold positions in West and East Germany, as well as in Austria, while Southern Europe remained under authoritarian rule for decades. Greece’s military junta of the late 1960s, for example, included figures with explicit fascist sympathies.

Cold War divisions further shaped this continuity. In Western Europe, anticommunism often took priority over full de-Nazification, leading to political compromises. In Eastern Europe, fascism was replaced not by liberal democracy but by Soviet-backed authoritarian regimes. What defined the postwar era, therefore, was not the eradication of fascist ideas, but their temporary political containment — one that weakened as historical memory faded.

Observers are now asking themselves this question: Under what conditions has the old nightmare returned?

After World War II, the devastation caused by racist ideologies like Nazism and fascism remained painfully vivid for surviving Europeans. For those who had witnessed concentration camps, gas chambers and inhuman atrocities, fascism was a horror meant to remain forever buried. But as time passed, this memory slowly faded.

Today, for younger generations who did not experience the war — and thus cannot fully grasp the consequences of such ideologies — fascism has transformed into a rhetoric of “strength” and “protection,” stripped of its true danger. Yet Europe’s far-right surge in the mid-2010s cannot be explained solely by this generational gap.

The migration wave that reshaped Europe

One of the strongest drivers of the far right’s rise is the issue of irregular migration. After the Arab Spring, a massive wave of migration from Africa and Asia reshaped Europe’s demographic landscape. With this shift came rising crime rates and social tension in several European capitals, fueling deep frustration among native populations.

Generous state support for migrants, citizenship policies and debates over voting rights — combined with rapid demographic change — have triggered widespread backlash. Many citizens believe they are “losing their country,” and this anger has helped elevate far-right parties to power through elections.

Far-right movements have successfully transformed these policy debates into narratives of cultural displacement and economic injustice. Welfare systems, housing shortages and labor market competition are frequently framed as zero-sum struggles, in which migrants are portrayed as beneficiaries at the expense of native citizens. This framing has proven particularly effective during periods of economic uncertainty and political fragmentation.

In recent elections, far-right parties have become governing forces or coalition partners in 14 of the EU’s 27 member states. Even more strikingly, Germany’s AfD (Alternative for Germany) has achieved record support, while traditionally social-democratic countries such as Sweden and Finland have seen far-right movements closer to power than ever before.

However, migration alone does not explain the far right’s growing appeal. Economic insecurity, rising living costs, housing shortages and declining trust in political institutions have also contributed to voter disillusionment across Europe. In many cases, far-right parties have capitalized on frustration with political elites rather than offering coherent ideological alternatives.

Moreover, Europe’s far-right landscape is far from unified. While these movements often share anti-immigration and nationalist rhetoric, they diverge sharply on issues such as relations with Russia, the EU and economic policy. Poland offers a clear example of this fragmentation, where right-wing forces compete with one another rather than forming a cohesive ideological bloc.

A resurgence of antisemitism

Another factor fueling the far right is the rise of antisemitism. Israel’s assault on Gaza has intensified negative perceptions of Israel and Jews across Europe. The scale of suffering in Gaza has reignited historical antisemitic undercurrents, which far-right parties have exploited for political gain.

However, the resurgence of antisemitism in Europe cannot be explained by the Gaza war alone. Multiple forces have converged to produce this trend, including the spread of online radicalization, conspiracy theories and political polarization. Social media platforms have accelerated the circulation of antisemitic narratives, often detached from historical context and amplified through algorithmic echo chambers.

Antisemitic dynamics in parts of Eastern Europe are also shaped by decades of Soviet rule. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union officially condemned antisemitism while promoting state-sponsored “anti-Zionism,” which often blurred into hostility toward Jewish identity itself. This rhetoric persisted after the collapse of the USSR, leaving behind a political culture where suspicion toward Jewish institutions, cosmopolitanism and liberal pluralism could be expressed indirectly. While contemporary far-right movements are not direct continuations of Soviet ideology, this legacy helps explain why antisemitic narratives in post-communist societies often differ from those in Western Europe.

Disturbingly, anger toward Israel has sometimes morphed into open sympathy for Nazi imagery, particularly among younger generations. Nazi salutes reappear in public spaces, from European cities to American schools, whereswastikas are drawn, Nazi gestures are replicated without understanding their meaning and fascist symbols are increasingly normalized.

The decline of the center

However, the erosion of centrist politics has not been uniform across Europe. While countries such as France, Italy, and parts of Eastern Europe have experienced significant polarization and the hollowing out of traditional center-left and center-right parties, others — such as Denmark and the Baltic states — have maintained relatively stable political systems despite growing pressures.

In some Nordic states, far-right parties have moved beyond fringe politics and now influence governing coalitions. In Finland, the nationalist Finns Party is part of the ruling coalition alongside the conservative National Coalition Party, giving it a direct role in shaping government policy. In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats, a party with a history of nationalist and anti-immigration politics, support the center-right government and help set its legislative agenda.

Where centrist politics has weakened most, it has often failed to address economic inequality, housing crises, and cultural anxieties in a credible way. In these environments, centrist parties are frequently perceived as technocratic, distant or overly aligned with elite interests, leaving space for populist actors to present themselves as authentic alternatives.

Rebuilding the political center will require more than rhetorical appeals to democratic values. It demands concrete policy responses to economic insecurity, clearer migration governance and renewed efforts to reconnect political institutions with everyday social concerns. Without such reforms, centrist politics risks further decline — even in countries where it has so far remained resilient.

Together, these developments reveal the steady collapse of centrist politics in Europe. Continued migration pressures, geopolitical crises and populist manipulation suggest that the far right’s momentum is unlikely to fade soon.

As Umberto Eco once warned, “Fascism is still around us, and it sometimes appears wearing civilian clothes. Fascism can return under the most innocent disguises. Our duty is to unmask it and point out its new forms wherever they may appear.”

[Patrick Bodovitz edited this piece]

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Fair Observer’s editorial policy.

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